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The formation of new, powerful economic  and trading blocs  and
the  transition to market economies in  Central and  perhaps
Eastern Europe has fostered a trend toward new regionalism in
the world economy - which the virtual failure of the GAiT
negotiations may speed up. To minimize economic losses and
avoid marginalization, regional groups of developing countries
must increasingly work out common positions and join one of
the influential groups.
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Economic  integration  among  developing  countries  New  approaches  to regional  cooperation  have
became  an important  policy  issue  in the 1960s  and  emerged.  Attempts  to revitalize  dormant  regional
early 1970s. But  although  intraregional  trade  groups,  to form new  blocs,  and to set panly new
increased  in some  trading  groups,  it remained  a  priorities  are on the increase.  Trade  is the most
modest  share  of total  trade,  tended  to decline  in the  important  element  of the new initiatives,  but  assess-
1970s,  and stagnated  during  most of the 1980s. In  ments  of the possibilities  and limits  of regional
addition,  ambitious  plans  for  joint industrialization  integration  have  changed  since  the 1960s.
could  not be implemented.
Stabilization  and adjustment  policies  have
This  failure  could be attributed  partly  to tL  created  more  open,  export-oriented,  liberal,  and
smallness  of most  of the markets,  different  political  competitive  economies.  Higher  exports  have  gener-
and economic  policy  orientations,  the low  level  of  ated more  growth  and regional  demand.  Industrial
economic,  industrial,  and infrastructural  development,  restructuring  has improved  competitiveness,  attracted
and similar  production  and  export  patterns.  Also,  international  capital  and technology,  and opened  up
serious  problems  arose  in implementing  the main  areas  of intra-industrial  division  of labor. Export-
objectives. Trade  liberalization  was  blocked  or  oriented  economies  have  proved  increasingly  com-
substantially  slowed  down,  highly  protective  barriers  petitive  in extraregional  markets.
to trade  remained  untouched  or were  harmonized
regionally,  and controversy  about  the distribution  of  In mosL  cases it was  not  the regional  training  but
gains  and losses  could nol be resolved. Dramatic  successful  outward-looking  policies  that improved
changes  in the world  economy  further  affected  the  competitiveness  within  the region  and resulted  in
environment  for regional  integration  and  cooperation.  higher  intraregional  trade  volumes.  The strengthen-
ing  of the private  sector  and closer  cooperation  in
But  the formation  of new,  powerful  economic  infrastructure  development  (mostly  the morc  efficient
and trading  blocs-such  as the single  market  of the  use  of human  resources)  support  the shaping  of an
European  Community,  the U.S.-Canada  free  trade  environment  conducive  to new  opportunities  for
area,  initiatives  in the Pacific  basin,  and the transition  better  regional  trade.
to market  economies  in Central  and perhaps  Eastem
Europe  - seems  to have  fostered  a trend  toward  now  Obviously,  intraregional  trade  cannot  become  an
regionalism  in the world  economy. The virtual  failure  alternative  to trade  flows  that  are basically  oriented  to
of the GATr negotiations  may  speed  this up. To  the world  market. But in the 1990s,  intraregional
minimize  economic  losses  and  avoid marginalization,  trade  and economic  relations  are likely  to  grow
regional  groups  of developing  countries  must increas-  parallel  to, or even  at a higher  rate than,  extraregional
ingly work out common positions and join one of Lhe  contacts.
influential  groups. Both  factors  require  the  gradual
yet rapid  dismantling  of barriers  lo the free flow  of
production  factors  within  regional  groups.
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I. IntroducticA.
Economic  integration  among  developing  countries  became  an important
research  topic  and  a  major  policy  issue  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s.  In  the
years  that  followed,  however,  implementation  failures  and  shortcomings  as  well
as  changing  International  economic  conditions  substantially  reduced  the  attention
paid  to  this  topic.  Although  most  developing  countries  remained  members  of  at
least  one regional  grouping,  poor,  if any, results  in trade,  industrial
cooperation  or  institutional  development  were  reported.
Since  the  mid-1980s,  internal  and  external  shocks,  adjustment  requirements,
and  changing  economic  policies  have  given  birth  to  new  approaches.  It  is  still
premature  to  assess  the  success  or  failure  of  these  attempts,  because  most  new
initiatives  are  scheduled  to  be  implemented  in  the  months  and  years  to  come.  A
number  of  initiatives,  led  by  the  ambitious  target  of  creating  a  common  market
by  2010,  emerged  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  Union  of  Arab  Maghreb  was  founded
in  early  1989,  with  the  just-recently  declared  aim  of  introducing  unified  import
tariffs  by  1991 and  achieving  full  customs  union  by  1995.  In  addition,  the  Gulf
Cooperation  Council,  a  previously  loosely-organized  regional  cooperation  group
became  active  in  trade,  financial,  and  infrastructural  areas.  ASEAN  (Association
of South  East  Asian  Nations),  which  in  the  past  had  emphasized  extraregional
economic  and  trade  orientation,  has  taken  steps  towards  the  establishment  of  a
regional  common  market.  In  Latin  America,  the  revival  and  dynamization  of  the
Central  American  Common  Market  may  acquire  urgency  following  the  latest  political
changes  in  the  area. The  until-now  dormant  Andean  Pact  is  considering  the
elimination  of  barriers  to  intraregional  trade  by  1993,  hoping  to  achieve  harmony
amongst  the  member  countries'  economic  polIcies.  Meanwhile,  Argentina  and  Brazil2
have  been  engaged  1n  strengthening  bilateral  contacts  that  are  expected  to  set
the  foundation  for  broader  regional  integration  in  the  future.
Simultaneously,  also  r'  lonalization  trends  in  developed  parts  of the
world  economy  explain  the  a:  arent  comeback  of  the  idea  of  regional  integration
and  cooperation.  Some  examples  of  these  trends  are: The  US-Canada  free  trade
agreement;  ongoing  negotiations  for  Mexico  to  establish  a free  trade  area  with
the  United  States,  the  Bush  initiative  for  the  creation  of  conditions  conducive
to  free  trade  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  proposals  for  trade  preferences  In  the
Pacific  basin,  and  most  importantly,  the  EC  '92  program  of  the  single  market,
which  forces  developing  countries  to  reconsider  the  chances  of  broader  regional
cooperation.
The  EEC  (European  Economic  Community),  established  in  1957,  was  a  major
factor  behind  the  decision  in  the  1960s  of  many  developing  countries  to  form
regionally  integrated  groups.  For  reasons  to  be  discussed  later  in  this  paper,
these  imitations  generally  failed  while  the  EEC  became  a  successful  trade  bloc
with  substantial  international  economic  influence.  At  present,  the  challenge
is no longer  how  to voluntarily  imitate  the EC but how  to adjust  to new
realities.
Is regional  integration  among  developing  countries  (RIDC)  an adequate
response  to  this  challenge,  and  will  it  prevent  the  further  marginalization  of
several  national  economies?  Should  the  new  approach  be different  from  the
traditional,  one-sided  trade  policy-oriented  concept?  If  yes,  what  kind  of  new
instruments  can  or  should  be  applied?  Will  regional  cooperation  and  integration
contribute  more  efficiently  to  economic  adjustment  than  do  economic  policies
formulated  and implemented  within  a national  framework?  In sum,  is there
justification  for  narrowing  the  wide  gap  between  the  RIDC's  declared  goals  and3
ac..leved  results,  and for solving  the fundamental  contradiction  between
"brilliant  perspectives  and  formidable  everyday  constraints"  (Tavares  de  Araujo,
1987),  experienced  by  regional  integrations  in  the  last  decades?
This  paper  concentrates  on  some  of  the  crucial  issues  and  lessons  raised
by the development  of integration  processes  among  LDCs (least  developed
countries).  We have  collected,  on  a comparative  level,  statistical  data  and
practical  experience  covering  ten  regional  integrations.  Four  of  the  groups
selected  are from  Latin  America: Central  American  Common  Market  (CACH),
Caribbean  Common  Market  (CARICOM),  Latin  American  Integration  Association  (LAIA),
and  the  Andean  Pact.  Another  four  are  from  Africa:  Economic  and  Customs  Union
in  Central  Africa  (UDEAL);  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWIAS),
Southern  African  Development  Coordination  Conference  and  Preferential  Trade  Area
of  Eastern  and  Southern  African  States  (SADCC-PTA),  and  the  Arab  Maghreb  Union.
We  have  also  included  one  bloc  from  Asia,  the  Association  of  South  East  Asian
Nations  (ASEAN),  and  one  from  the  Middle  East,  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council
(GCC).  (See  the  annex  for  list  of  the  member  countries.)
This  paper  is  divided  into  two  fundamental  parts. Section  II  analyzes
the  most  important  elements  in  the  RIDC's  failure  during  the  1970s  and  1980s.
It  concentrates  on  theoretical  issues,  implementation  failures,  adverse  impacts
of the international  economy,  and fundamental  sociopolitical  differences.
Section  III  describes  recent  or revived  arguments  in favor  of regional
integration,  and  points  to  new  approaches  in  critical  areas  of  trade  policy,
cooperation  in  infrastructural  development,  and  joint  activities  vis-&-vis  third
(non-regional)  countries  or  their  groups.  Section  IV  summarizes  lessons  and
conclusions.4
II.  Why  Did  the  RiDC  not  Succeed?
A,  Incorrect  Theoretica,  Setting
1. Trade  Theory
The  first  two  phases  of  economic  integration,  the  creation  of  a  free  trade
area  and  the  establishment  of  a  customs  union,  were  originally  elaborated  and
proposed  for  groups  formed  by  developed  industrial  countries.  The  abolition  of
barriers  to  intraregional  trade  and  the  implementation  of  common  external  tariffs
in  relation  to  third  countries  were  expected  to  increase  welfare  by  replacing
higher  priced  domestic  products  by lower  priced  products  purchased  from  the
integrated  area.  Although  the  efficiency  of  this  substitution  process  has  been
hampered  by  the  imposition  of  common  external  tariffs  that  provided  preferences
to  higher-cost  regional  imports  compared  to  .ower-cost  imports  from  outside  the
region,  the  benefits  due  to  trade  creation  were  supposed  to  outweigh  potential
losses  from  trade  diversion.
This  theory  was hased  on the assumptions  that:  (a)  by integrating
developed  economies,  a large  and  differentiated  regional  market  would  emerge;
(b)  the  member  countries  had  diversified  production  patterns  in  which  industrial
goods  prevailed,  so  that  competition  and  specialization  efforts  would  become
stronger;  and  (c)  member  countries  had  a long  history  of  intensive  trade  and
capital  flows  and  an  efficient  infrastructure  long  before  common  trade  policy
had  been  initiated.
Unfortunately,  none  of  these  preconditions  are  sufficiently  present  in
the  RIDC.  All  regional  groupings  of  developing  countries  have  modest  aggregate
national  income  and small  collective  markets  (Table  1).  The GNP  of the
relatively  most  powerful  Latin  American  Integration  Association  (LAIA)  is  only
16  percent  higher  than  that  of  EFTA,  and  is  similar  to  that  of  France.  ASEAN's5
tot  1  GNP  equals  Spairn's;  the  Maghreb's  GNP  is  comparable  to  Turkey's;  and
CARICOM's  GNP  does  not  surpass  that  of  Uruguay.  The  CACM  and  UDEAC  in  Central
Africa  each,  have  an  aggregate  GNP  lower  th-.n  that  of  Hungary.  Considering  all
regional  blocs formed  by developing  countries,  and even v  -n membership
duplications  occur  in  more  than  one  group,  their  total  GNP  is  akout  one-third
of  the  EC's  GNP.
In light  of Import  figures,  the  market  size  of the  RIDC  is  even  more
limited.  This  is  not  only  due  to  its  modest  GNP  but  also  due  to  its  long  history
of  closed,  autarchic,  import-substituting  development  patterns.  For  example,
LAIA's  total  imports  are  as high  as  Hong  Kong's,  and  the  import  markets  of
CARICOM,  CACM,  or  UDEAC  are  the  same  as  that  of  Kuwait.  Even  ASEAN,  whose  momber
countries  pursued  export-oriented  economic  policies,  imports  80  percent  less  than
EFTA  and  less  than  10  percent  of total  impc-ts  by the  EC.  All the  RIDCs
considered  in  Table  1 have  an aggregate  import  market  that  is less  than  10
percent  of  world  imports  and  is  comparable  to  imports  by  West  Germany.
These  facts  do  not  justify  the  frequently-used  argument  that  the  large
populations  of some  RIDCs  are a major  potential  advantage  of integration.
Certainly,  LAIA  is  more  populous  than  the  EC,  and  ASEAN's  total  l  mation  is
rapidly  approaching  the  EC  level.  However,  low  per  capita  income,  aggravated
by  highly  uneven  distribution,  and  generally  extremely  low  import  per  capita
figures,  inmpose  a  major  constraint  on  the  total  volume  of  effective  regional
demand.
In  addition,  potential  gains  from  specialization  are  usually  small.  Member
countries  often  display  modest  differences  in  relative  factor  endowments.  They
tend  to  export  competing  goods  that  are  produced  in  every  or  several  member6
countries  and import  goods,  services,  and production  factors  (capital,
technology)  that  are  not  available  within  the  region.
In historical  retrospect,  trade and economic  contacts  have been
fundamentally  established  with  and  shaped  bv  extraregional  markets.  As  a  result,
neighboring  markets  are  often  unknown  and  the  infrastructure  within  a  regional
group  is generally  underdeveloped,  which  Is a major  barrier  to enhanced
intraregional  trade.  In  1989,  intraregional  exports  by  the  RIDC  totalled  $40.5
billion  or 1.34 percent  of world exports,  and less than 5 percent  of
intraregional  trade  in  the  EC  (Table  2). Even  compared  to  total  South-South
trade,  the  RIDC's  share  amounts  to  only  31  percent,  with  about  70  percent  being
interregional  trade  flows.  Only  ASEAN's  and  LAIA's  intraregional  exports  ($22.6
billion  and  $9.3  billion  in  1989,  respectively)  deserve  some  attention  as  volumes
of international  significance.  On  examining  the  share  of intraregional  trade
in  total  trade  for  the  groups  selected,  ASEAN's  18  percent  figure  stands  out,
while  that  of  CACM,  CARICOM,  and  LMIA  is  in  the  10  to  13  percent  range.  In  all
other  groups  this  figure  is  far  below  10  percent,  and  in  some  cases  even  below
5  percent.  Compared  with  the  same  indicator  of  more  than  60  percent  for  the  EC,
the  decisive  role  of  extraregional  to  intraregional  trade  is  indisputable.
2. The  Training  Ground  Theory
This theory  starts  out from the hypothesis  that the international
competitiveness  of  developing  countries  can  be  gradually  improved  by  relying  on
the  regional  market  in  the  first  phase  of  industrialization.  Free  trade  among
members  and  usually  high  (common)  external  tariffs  on extraregioral  imports
temporari  y  protect  infant  industries  and  provide,  at  the  same  time,  suff1icently
large  markets  for  future  development.  Entrance  into  the  world's  market  may  be7
considered  after  reaching  a  certain  degree  of  efficiency,  due  to  advantages  of
economies  of  scale,  technical  development,  and  specialization  on  the  regional
level.  ihus,  regional  integration  provides  a  transitional  period  in  the  way  to
global  division  of  labor.
The  facts,  however,  do  not  support  this  theory.  The  approximately  two
dozen  newly  industrialized  and  newly  exporting  countries  (NICs  and  NECs)  that
emerged  in  the  last  10  to  20  years,  became  industrial  expevters  primarily  by
entering  the highly  competitive  world  market  and not  because  of help  from
protected  regional  markets.  Except  in  specific  cases,  economies  focusing  on
the  regional  market  for  industrial  products  could  not  usually  gain  international
competitiveness.  In 1970,  39 percent  of South-South  trade  consisted  of
manufactured  goods,  compared  with  only  20  percent  of  the  South's  exports  to  the
North. By  1989,  exports  to  the  developed  countries  became  structurally  more
developed  than  those  to  other  developing  economies  --  58.7  percent  against  the
53.4  percent  represented  by  industrial  products  (United  Nations,  1990).
To  summarize,  the  regional  training  ground  argument  has  been  weakened  by
several  factors:  (1)  the  fundamentally  narrow  regional  markets  did  not  offer
economies of  scale  advantages;  (2)  the  structural  pattern  of  extra-  and
intraregional  exports  differed  widely;  and  (3)  little  or  no structural  upgrading
took  place  as  a  consequence  of  the  regional  "learning  process".
3. Dependency  Theory
From  the  very  beginning,  some  politicians  and  economists  considered  the
RIDC  a  useful  tool  for  loosening  and  gradually  eliminating  the  historically  deep
economic  and  structural  dependence  of  LDCs  on  the  developed  world.  As  national
import  substitution  became  not  only  increasingly  costly  but  also  started  to8
increase  dependence  on  vital  external  sources,  regional  integration,  i.e.  import
substitution  on  the  regional  level,  was  expected  to  break  up  the  traditional
dependence  pattern.  In  some  cases,  the  fundamental  aims  to  be  achieved  through
the RIDC  were the strengthening  of self-reliance  and improvement  of the
collective  terms  of  trade  with  regard  to  developed  countries,  combined  with  the
common  struggle  against  growing  protectionism.
However,  the  path  taken  led  to increasing  inefficiencies,  low  quality
production,  lack  or loss  of competitiveness,  and  perpetuation  of regional
underdevelopment.  Dependence  on  the  external  world  could  not  be  reduced;  on
the  contrary,  it  tended  to increase,  as 'inancial  flows,  technological  and
managerial  skills,  and  in  most  cases  also  .rade  links  could  not  be  substituted
by  intraregional  assets.  Even  If  some  opportunities  for  self-reliance  seemed  to
open  up,  the  low  level  of  most  and  the  lack  of  some  regional  resources,  as  well
as  the  similar  or  identical  product  pattern  of  the  member  countries  put  serious
constraints  on  "independent"  development.  Substitution  possibilities  between
intra-  and  extraregional  markets  remained  generally  very  poor,  because  the
potential  or  intraregional  trade  could  usually  absorb  only  a  slight  portion  of
extraregional  trade.  As  a result,  competition  for  scarce  resources  and  export
markets  increased  among  member  countries  belonging  to  the  same  regional  group.
Although  international  protectionism  grew in some sectors  in which
developing  countries  traditionally  had  comparative  advantages,  the  general  level
of  tariff  protection  declined  in  the  last  two  decades,  and  a number  of new,
dynamic  markets  emerged.  At  the  same  time,  the  fact  that  intraregional  trade
faced  higher  barriers  than  those  erected  by  extraregional  markets,  was  often
overlooked.9
The  theory  of  collective  terms  of  trade  improvement  ignores  the  fact  that
a particular  regional  integration  (in  most  c-ses  even  'he  developing  world  as
a whole)  controls  only  a  modest  share  of  world  production  and  market. This
market  share  is  unlikely  to  offer  sufficient  bargaining  power  for  a  long  period.
B. Unsatisfactory  Implementation
Although  the  failure  of  the  traditional  approach  tc  integration  cannot  be
separated  from  incorrect  theoretical  assumptions,  the  practical  shortcomings  of
the  implementation  of  the  agreed-upon  goals,  are  also  obvious.
A comparison  between  the  basic  documents  prepared  by  various  regional
groups  of  developing  countries  and  those  elaborated  by  the  EC,  or  the  most  recent
free  trade  agreement between the  US and Canada, reveal  striking  differences
(Tavares de Araujo,  1990).  First,  while  the U.S.-Canada  trade agreement  contains
an  extremely  detailed  description  of mutual  commitments,  the documents
establishing  the  RIDC  are  a summary  of loosely-formulated  general  proposals,
without quantitative  projections  or  an  accurately-detailed  legal and
institutional  framework.  Thus,  the  effective  impact  o,i  the  member  countries
cannot  be  properly  assessed,  nor  can  member  countries  be  compelled  to  observe
fundamental  commitments  made. Second,  the  objectives  of  the  RIDC  try  to  cover
almost  all  areas  of  potential  cooperation,  rather  than  concentrating  on  one  or
a  limited  number  of  priorities.  Third,  developed  market  economies  are  prodded
into  regional  integration  by  major  economic  participants.  Only  then  do the
government  or other  institutions  involved  in  the integration  respond  with
adequate  policy  measures.  In  contrast,  in  the  RIDC  the  integration  schemes  are
essentially  derived  from  political  concepts  and  efforts.  While,  in  the  developed
market  economies  development  is  organic,  from  bottom  to top,  from  economic10
realities  towards  political  decision-making,  In  the  RIDC,  the  opposite  occurs
and  politically  generated  agreements  are  imposed  on  economically  insufficiently
prepared  national  economies.
In  the  international  l'terature  on  regional  integration,  the  main  indicator
of  success  used  to  be  a  growing  share  of  intraregional  trade  in  total  trade,
while  a  decreasing  share  is  an  indication  of  failure.  This  approach,  however,
can  be attacked  from  at least  two sides.  First,  the impacts  of regional
integration  cannot  be reduced  to intraregional  trade.  Joint industrial
development.,  establishment  of  basic infrastructural  links and  better
communication  on  the  .nterprise  level  generally  precede  growing  trade  volumes.
More importantly,  higher  intraregional  trade  shares  may be the result  of
substantial  trade  diversion  from  more  efficient  extraregional  imports  to  less
efficient  intraregional  sources.  In  this  case,  the  international  competitiveness
of  regional  integration  is  threatened  and  its  share  in  world  trade  is  likely  to
decline.  Therefore,  growing  intraregional  share  can  only  be  seen  as  a  positive
development  if  it  is  accompanied  by  increasing  competitiveness  of  the  region  in
global  trade.
In  the  last  decade,  the  RIDCs  absorbed  a  modest  and  mostly  decreasing  or
stagnating  share  in  its  member  countries'  total  trade. Surprisingly  enough,
ASEAN,  whose  member  countries  have  been  pursuing  export-oriented  development
policies,  has  the  highest  intraregional  exports,  both  in  its  volume  and  as  a
share  of  total  exports.  After  a  temporary  upswing  through  1983  (to  23  percent),
however,  its  intraregional  exports  stagnated  in  the  16  to  18  percent  range.  LAIA
was  unable  to  break  out  of  this  stagnation  in  the  1980s  and CACM,  once  the  most
successful  regional  group,  experienced  a  sharp  decrease  of  intraregional  export11
shares  after  1980. All  the  other,  even  less  important  regional  groups  reveal
stagnating  or  slightly  changing  intraregional  trade  shares  (Table  2).
This  general  picture  becomes  less  homogeneous  when  trade  orientation  of
the  individual  member  countries  is  analyzed.  Smaller,  landlocked  economJes
generally  show  above  average  regional  orientation.  As an  example,  in  1987
intraregional  exports  amounted  to  30  percent  of  Uruguay's  total  exports,  while
the  corresponding  figures  were  45 percent  for  Paraguay  and  62 percent  for
Bolivia.
There  are  also  substantial  differences  in  the  commodity  pattern  of  Intra-
and  extraregional  exports.  In  the  1960s  and  part  of  the  1970s,  raw  material-
and  capital-intensive  manufactured  exports  were  preferably  sold  on  the  regional
market,  while  primary  goods  and  labor-intensive  industrial  products  revealed  a
clear  extrarigional  orientation.  The  less  developed  a  member  country  was,  the
more  pronounced  the  bias.  In  the  1980s,  countries  pursuing  outward-looking
economic  policies  were  likely  to  experience  decreases  in  the  differences  in  the
commodity  pattern  of intra-  and  extraregional  exports. Growing  structural
harmonization  could  be identified,  even  in  regional  groups  containing  less
export-oriented  economies  (LAIA,  Andean  Pact,  UDEAC),  although  intrareglonal
exports  usually  had  a higher  share  of  manufactured  goods  than  extraregional
exports  (Rodriguez,  1990). (A  broad  statistical  comparison  of  the  changing
pattern  of intra-  and  extraregional  exports  in  various  regional  Integrations
between  1976  and  1986  is  in  progress.)
Trade  liberalization  was  a slow  and  selective  process,  not  only  in  the
mainly  import  substituting  economies  but  also  in  more  export-oriented  groups
(ASEAN).  As  a  result,  original  timetables  were  not  observed.  As  regional  trade
liberalization  approached  the highly  protected  "hard  core"  of domestically12
produced  goods,  the  process  usually  stopped  and  sometimes  was  even  reversed.
In  the  first  stage,  tariff  cuts  were  abundant,  but  they  did  not  affect  national
production.  Part  of  the  liberalized  items  have  never  been  imported,  others  have
never  been  produced  within  the  regional  group  (Greenaway  and  Milner,  1990).
Products  that  have  been  manufactured  within  the  group,  particularly  if  production
was located  in  more  than  one country,  were  generally  phased-out  of trade
liberalization  and  put  on  the  list  of  "sensitive  products".
Additional  protection  was  provided  by  widely  used  non-tariff  barriers  and
strong  national  rules  of  origin  (e.g.  In  Latin  American  car  production).  In
this  context,  it  is  not  surprising  that  several  countries  found  it  easier  to
export  to  extraregional  markets  than  to have  access  to  the  regional  market,
particularly  if  they  enjoyed  preferential  treatment  in  third  countries  --  for
example,  African  exports  to  the  EC  (Intra-Regional  Trade,  1988).  In  this  way,
trade  liberalization  did  not  create  substantial  additional  trade  within  the
region. More  importantly,  it maintained  the  old  and inefficient  national
production  even  in  areas  in  which  regional  competition  and  reallocation  of
resources  might  have resulted  in increased  international  competitiveness,
emerging  intra-industry  linkages  and  greater  intraregional  trade.
Common  external  tariffs  (CcT)  established  in  the  CACM  and  the  UDEAC,  as
well  as  common  minimum  external  tariffs  implemented  in  the  Andean  Group,  tended
to  reinforce  structural  distortions  and  production  inefficiencies.  If  there  was
regional  production  of  a  certain  product,  the  CET  was  fixed  in  the  higher  range
or  on the  highest  level  of  different  national  tariffs. In  case  of ongoing
production  (joint  industrial  projects,  infant  industries),  a  sufficiently  high
tariff  was  placed  for  effective  protection.  Consequently,  relatively  more
efficient  producers  started  to  lose  their  comparative  advantages  by  using  high-13
priced and several  times qualitatively  less-demanding  regional  inputs.
Recognizing  this  danger,  some  more  competitive  national  economies  did  not  apply
the  CET,  thus  leading  to  growing  disagreement  within  the  group.  To  make  matters
worse,  they  started  to  import  from  outside  the  region,  particularly  if  sufficient
foreign  exchange  was  available  and  if  production  based  on  extraregional  input
promised  international  competitiveness.  Thus,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  impact
of the  CET's  trade  diversion  could  be mitigated.  Moreover,  in some  cases
"negative  trade  diversion"  occurred,  when  new  national  and  regional  industrial
projects  required  additional  imports  available  only  from  outside  the  region
(Khazeh  and  Clark,  1990).
Joint  industrialization  remained  far behind  its ambitious  goals  of
enhancing  output,  diversifying  production  patterns  and implementing  equal
redistribution  of  costs  and  benefits.  As  trade  liberalization  excluded  most
current  production  from  tariff  preferences,  the  establishment  cf  new  industries
has  been  seen  as  the  main  beneficiary  of  tariff  cuts.  Distribution  of  production
rights  and  thorny  questions  of  joint  financing  have  provided  sufficient  explosive
material.  Even  if  generally  very  costly  development  project  packages  have  been
agreed  on,  their  implementation  met  a number  of barriers  in  the  individual
national  economies.  Often,  aggregate  regional  demand  fell  short  of  the  effective
capacity  of  just  one  joint  project.  This  situation  notwithstanding,  parallel
capacities  have  been created  in one or several  member  countries. Thus
cathedrals  In  the  desert"  were  erected  practically  everywhere  (Aghrout  and
Sutton,  1990). But  even  if  regionally  planned  industrialization  could  have
avoided  the  capacity  underutilization  trap,  the  oligopolistic  structure  would
have  blocked  the  way  to  meaningful  intra-industry  specialization.14
The  fewer  the  economic  gains  achieved  through  regional  integration,  the
greater  number  of  regional  institutions  that  have  been  established.  In  Africa,
there  are  more  than  200  organizations  of  cooperation,  80  percent  of  which  are
intergovernmental  bodies  (Inter-African  Cooperation,  1988).  They require
substantial  financial  resources,  time,  and  expert  knowledge  that  could  be  used
more  efficiently  in  other  areas.  Parallel  to  the  proliferation  of  institutions,
some  countries  became  members  in different  regional  groups. Simultaneous
commitments  to different  regional  efforts  raise  questions  about  the  member
country's  commitment  to  any  serious  undertaking.  At  the  same  time,  no  attempt
has  been  made  to  integrate  the  objectives  of  the  regional  integration  into  the
system  of  national  development  planning.
C. Adverse  World  Economic  Impact
From  the  mid-1970s  on, world  economic  development  began  to exert  a
substantial  impact  on  the  fate  of  the  RIDC. Economic  recession,  drastic  price
and  terms  of  trade  changes,  balance  of  payments  disequilibria,  and  dramatically
growing  indebtedness,  had  great  impact  on  the  economic  conditions  that  had  given
birth  to  regional  integration.
Almost  all  regional  groups  split  into  two  parts.  Some  countries  (mainly
oil-producing  and  -exporting  countries)  were,  temporarily,  in  a  better  position
than  others  (oil-importing  countries).  In  this  situation,  intra-group  economic
power relations  were reshaped,  and regional  solidarity  was increasingly
threatened.
More importantly,  increased  efforts  to enhance  exports  and attain
international  competitiveness  required  a  sometimes  dramatic  change  in  the  basic
economic  policy  orientation  of the  member  countries.  However,  this  export-15
orientation  would seem to contradict  the basic philosophy  of  regional
integration,  the  import  substitution  on  the  regional  level.  External  challenges
called  for  the  reassessment  of  previous  economic  strategies,  the  reshaping  of
production  patterns,  and  the  geographic  reorientation  of  exports.  The  sources
of  technology,  management  skills,  and  most  importantly,  direct  capital  --  all
necessary  elements  of a competitive  development  strategy  --  were almost
exclusively  outside  the boundaries  of regional  integration. Similarly,
orientation  on  the  world  market  required  quick  production  and  marketing  decisions
that  could  hardly  be  taken  by  a  group  of  countries  of  any  size,  characterized
by  different  economic  interests  and  lengthy  coordination  and  decision-making
procedures.
Worsening  terms  of trade  and  increasing  deficits  resulted  in growing
indebtedness.  This,  in  turn,  made  higher  exports  the  cornerstone  of  a viable
import  and  debt  financing  policy,  even  in  countries  that  did  not  opt  for  an
export-oriented  growth  strategy.  Given  their  small  and  dramatically  contracting
national  and  regional  markets,  exports  had  to be directed  to extraregional
markets. Although  relatively  rich  oil-exporting  member  countries  offered  a
temporarily  growing  import  market  to  regional  partners  (as  Colombia's  exports
to  Venezuela,  Indonesia's  growing  imports  from  ASEAN  and  Nigeria's  purchases  from
neighboring  ECOWAS  economies),  this  potential  remained  rather  modest,  compared
to  extraregional  opportunities,  and  mostly  used  by  more  efficient  extraregional
suppliers.
Other  factors  too,  had  a  negative  impact  on  the  importance  of  the  regional
market.  As  a result  of increasingly  difficult  financing,  interest  in  buying
higher-priced  and  lower-quality  goods  produced  by the  regional  partrkers  and
protected  by high  (common)  external  tariffs,  rapidly  vanished,  and  because16
international  competitiveness  of  exports  could  only  be  achieved  if  inputs  from
competitive  imports  were  used,  a  growing  shortage  of  convertible  currencies  led
to  substantial  import  cuts  and  substitution  processes  on  the  national  level.
Intraregional  imports  generally  suffered  more,  because  they  consisted  mainly  of
substitutable,  "non-vital"  items (mostly  consumer  goods and intermediate
products).  In  turn,  a  number  of  goods,  only  available  from  outside  the  region,
remained  non-substitutable,  "vital"  inputs,  regarding  domestic  production,
consumption  and  competitive  exports.
Declining  or negative  growth  rates,  accompanied  by sluggish  investment
activity,  further  constrained  intraregional  trade.  For  example,  intraregional
imports  of  manufactures  in  the  CACM  amounted  to  10  percent  of total  regional
consumption  of  manufactured  goods  in  1980,  but  had  declined  to  6 percent  in
1985,  while  the  share  of  extraregional  imports  in  regional  consumption  remained
unchanged  in  the  same  period  (Trade  Liberalization,  1989).
Meanwhile,  the  role  of  trade  policy  instruments  influencing  intrareglonal
trade  flows  had  also  been  changing.  First,  the  external  trade  liberalization
cum stabilization  policies  adopted  by various  countries  in  LAIA  practically
abolished  earlier  granted  preferential  treatments  (Manzetti,  1990).  The  trade
liberalization  achievements  of some  member  countries  became  more  and more
difficult  to  integrate  into  the  system  of  regional  preferences.  Second,  foreign
currency  shortages  and  the  protection  of  newly  established  high-cost  import-
substituting  production  led to what was hoped  would be a  "temporary"
reintroduction  of  earlier  lifted  QRs  and  increased  tariffs.  Even  when  no  new
barriers  were introduced,  the  original  time-table  for intraregional  trade
liberalization  was  either  completely  abandoned  or  it  was  determined  that  longer
transitional  periods  were  needed.  The  Andean  Group  gave  some  consideration  to17
"managed  trade"  (comercio  administrado)  in  order  to avoid  the  spreading  of
national  exemption  lists  and  to prevent  Individual  actions  that  seriously
threatened  the  existence  of  the  integration.  Third,  the  need  to  finance  growing
budget  deficits  limited  the viability  of trade policies  which required
substantial  intraregional  tariff  cuts  that  would  have  resulted  in  decreased
government  revenues.
In  the  1980s,  compensatory  payments  facilities  that  had  been  financing
relatively  high  volumes  of  intraregional  trade  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  either
partly  collapsed  or  suffered  substantial  contractions.  This  was  due  to  the  fact
that  either  pressing  debt  problems  impeded  the  transfer  of  even  modest  sums  to
the  compensatory  fund,  or  rapidly  growing  bilateral  trade  disequilibria  and  the
level  of accumulated  deficits  made  further  financing  by surplus  countries
impossible.  In  1988  in  Central  America,  less  than  1  percent  of  intraregional
trade  was  financed  through  the  compensation  mechanism  (Bendesky  and  Sanchez,
1990).  The  compensation  level  of  intraregional  trade  in  LAIA  (as  well  as  In
LAFTA,  its  predecessor),  which  was  a  high  as  77  percent  between  1986  and  1979,
declined  to 71  percent  in  1982  and  reached  its  peak  of  84 percent  by 1986.
Although  this  helped  member  countries  save  considerable  amounts  of  convertible
currency,  neither  the  fund's  facilities  nor  interregional  trade  expanded  during
this  period.  Argentina's  dramatically  increasing  trade  deficit  had,  in  Just  two
years,  undone  the  $400  million  bilateral  trade  financing  scheme  established
between  Argentina  and  Brazil  in
1986.
Exchange  rate  policies  have  affected  the  d'evelopment  of lntraregional
trade  also.  Steady  (gradual)  and  necessary  devaluations,  which  sometimes  ended
at damaging  devaluation  competition,  also  diverted  trade  from intra-  to18
extraregional  markts or, at the  very  least,  allowed  extraregional  exports
(consisting  mainly  of primary  goods)  to  be valued  higher  than  intraregional
exports. As a result  of diverging  stabilization  policies  and  '.;e  ensuing
diverging  official  exchange  rates  of  national  currencies  in  relation  to  the  U.S.
dollar,  national  currencies  became  over  and  sometimes  under-valued.  Member
countries  with the least  overvalued  (or  most undervalued)  currency  have
benefitted  the  most  from  intraregional  trade.  At the  same  time,  however,
regional  deficits  accumulated  rapidly  and  prevented  further  intraregional  trade
expansion.  The  monetary  union  could,  in  some  cases,  prevent  national  economies
from  different  degrees  of  devaluation,  but  at  an  unprecedentedly  high  price.
In  the  case  of  UDEAC  (which,  since  1948,  had  a  fixed  rate  of  1:50  between  the
French  franc  and  the  CFA),  the  region  became  chronically  uncompetitive,  its
production  highly  distorted,  and  the  official  intraregional  trade  practically
negligible.  In  turn,  unrecorded  trade,  i.e.  smuggling,  is  estimated  to  have
reached  figures  several  times  higher  than  those  revealed  by official  trade
statistics.
Although  practically  all national  economies  have  been challenged  by
dramatic  world  economic  changes,  not  all  of  them  have  been  equally  affected.
Indeed,  very  different  national  economic  policies  have  been  formulated  as  a
response  to  the  changing  environment.  But  even  if  economic  policies  had  been
based  on the  same  principles,  the  economic  and  social  backgrounds  for  their
implementation  would  still  have  been  substantially  different,  and,  consequently,
would  have  led  to  different  developments  from  country  to  country.  The  emerging
differences  were then compounded  by the technical  failures  of policy
implementation.  In  sum,  the  international  economy  tended  to  hinder  rather  than
support  the  harmonization  of  national  economic  policies  in  regional  integrations.19
D.  Different  Sociopolitical  and  Economic  Systems
RIDCs  were  usually  based  on  geographical  considerations,  as  reflected  in
the  official  name  of  most  regional  groups.  Considerably  less  attention  was  paid
to the sometimes  substantial  differences  in socio-political  and economic
orientation  among  member  countries.  Market-oriented  and  centrally-administered
economies  belonged  to  the  same  group  (Colombia  and  Peru  or  Allende's  Chile  In
the  Andean  Pact,  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua  in  CACM,  Kenya  and  Tanzania  in  the
former  East African  Common  Market),  as  did  countries  governed  by  democratically-
elected  parliaments  or  those  under  military  rule.  The legacy  of  permanent
territorial  problems and  unsolved  ethnic  issues  made cooperation  even more
complicated.  Fragile  governments  and  unstable  domestic  power  relations  made  the
formulation  and implementation  of longer-term  common  regional  development
strategies  more  difficult.  National  governments  tried  desperately  to  tie-in
national  sovereignty  with  economic  integration,  but  were  unwilling  to  give  up
even  a  small  fraction  of  the  former.  On  the  contrary,  economic  integration  was
often  considered  (at  least  L  the  larger  members  of  the  integration)  to  be  an
instrument  of  economic  expansion  and  to  strengthen  the  nation-state.
III.  New  Approaches  to  Regional  Integration
Despite  the  overwhelmingly  negative  experience  with  RIDC  in  the  past  two
decades,  most  recently,  the  idea  of  regional  integration  seems  to  reveal  some
signs  of  revitalization.  This  can  be  seen,  in  part,  in  the  growing  number  of
new  initiatives,  even  among  countries  that,  in  the  past,  have  been  fundamentally
separated  for  political  and  economic  reasons.  At  the  same  time,  the  share  of
intraregional  trade  in most groups  has been increasing  since  1985,  and20
particularly  after  1987.  Although  in  most  cases  it  did  not  even pproach  earlier
achieved  peak  levels,  and  intraregional  trade  remained  a  modest  part  of  total
trade,  the  short  term  trend  is  quite  unequivocal.  More importantly,  this
increase  was  not  caused  by  the  trade  diversion  that  resulted  from  previously
applied  and  frustrated  trade  policies.  On  the  contrary,  some  regional  groups
substantially  enhanced  their  exports  to  the  world,  while  others  (with  the  clear
exception  of  CACM,  the  Maghreb,  and  UDEAC)  kept  pace  with  the  expansion  of  world
trade.  It  is  with  this  in  mind  that  the  increasing  share,  i.e.  the  above  average
growth  of  intraregional  exports,  should  be  assessed.  With  the  exception  of  LAIA,
GCC  and  SADCC-PTA,  intraregional  exports  grew  faster  than  the  region's  total
exports  and  grew  at  a  substantially  higher  rate  than  world  exports,  at  current
prices  between  1987  and  1989  (Table  3).
Does  this  mean  that  a renaissance  of RIDC  may  yet  occur? And,  more
importantly,  does  this  new  approach  promise  more  success  because  of  the  lessons
learned  from  the  earlier  experiments  of  the  last  decade?  It  is  still  too  early
to  give  a  straightforward  answer  to  these  questions.  Unfortunately,  there  are
no  common  features  that  would  apply  to  all  regional  schemes.  At least  two  of
the  arguments  in  favor  of  integration  can  be  shown  to  be  heavily  influenced  by
the  individual  countries'  expectations  of  medium-term  economic  prospects.
On  the  one  hand,  several  national  economies  with  clear  adjustment  deficits,
almost  hopeless  underdevelopment,  and  growing  marginalization,  insist  on  the
traditional  arguments  in  favor  of regional  integration.  They  argue  that  if
underdevelopment  cannot  be  overcome  and  if  their  economies  remain  desperately
uncompetitive  in  the  world  market,  then  economic  integration  as  a second  best
(or  second  worst?)  scenario  may  help  alleviate  the  crisis,  avoid  increasing
poverty,  break  historical  dependencies,  and strengthen  elements  of self-21
reliance.  Repeated  efforts  to  crate  an  African  common  market  are  primarily  based
on  this  set  of  arguments.
On  the  other  hand,  national  economies  that  in  the  last  decade  underwent
substantial  restructuring  and  pursued  more  open,  world  market-oriented  policies,
seem  to  have  rediscovered  the  opportunities  offered  by  regional  integration.
Indeed,  regional  integration  is  no longer  seen  as an instrument  of import
substitution  on  the  regional  level,  but  as  part  of  a  new  strategy  based  on  more
competitive  production  and  export  patterns,  and  on  the  acceptance  of  the  rules
of the game  that  characterize  international  trade  and economic  relations.
Although  economic  liberalization  might  have  broken  some  of the  earlier  and
usually  non-competitive  regional  links  and  replaced  them  with  extraregional
contacts,  it  has  laid  the  foundation  for  efficient  regional  cooperation.
Some  of  the  specific  effects  of  economic  liberalization  are  as  follows:
(1)  it  generated  higher  growth  rates  that  led  to  higher  internal  demand.  Various
potential  exporters,  including  those  from  the  region,  had  expanding  markets  as
their  objective;  (2) structural  upgrading,  coupled  with the changing  of
production  patterns  based  on comparative  advantages  in  international  trade,
created  growing  opportunities  for  intra-industry  division  of labor;  (3)  the
general  opening  up  of  the  economies  lessened  protectionist  pressure  and  helped
a  new entrepreneurial  spirit  to emerge  --  for example,  contacts  among
representatives  of  private  business,  such  as  producers,  exporters,  importers,
bankers,  etc.,  became  much  more  frequent;  (4)  because  the  liberalization  process
as  well  as  the  instruments  used,  were  similar  in  various  countries,  national
economic  policies  became  more  transparent,  and  differences  between  countries  were
lessened;  (5)  rapidly  expanding  regional  markets  prompted  multinational  companies
to reassess  their  strategies,  which  had previously  focused  on setting  up22
production  in  protected  national  markets.  The  economic  liberalization  of  various
national  economies  in  the  same  region  is  likely  to  shift  investment  decisions
towards  fewer,  but  more  efficient,  projects  that  produce  for  several  countries
in  the  region.  The  expected  forward-  and  backward-linkages  may  support  regional
integration  on  the  microeconomic  level,  as  is  already  the  case  in  ASEAN.
In  some  cases,  common  economic  (debt  strategies,  trade  agreements  with
major  trading  partners,  sustainability  of  stabilization  and  adjustment  programs)
and  political  interests  (stability  of  new,  democratically-elected  governments)
led  to  regular  meetings  and  working  contacts.  Better  understanding  of  each
other's  perceptions  and  goals,  as  well  as  the  unquestionable  priority  of  pressing
economic  problems,  resulted  in  decreasing  political  controversies  and  in  the
settlement  of  a  number  of  inherited  conflicts  (primarily  in  Latin  America).
The  new  regional  approach  can  be  identified  in  three  main  areas:  (a)  in
trade  policy;  (b)  in  infrastructural  cooperation;  (c)  in  joint  actions  vis-a-
vis  third  countries  or  groups  of  countries.
A. Developments  in  Tradc  Policy  and  Performance
Several  countries  who had  paid  little  attention  in the 1980s  to the
possibilities  for intraregional  trade  are now rediscovering  the relative
importance  of  regional  markets.  This,  however,  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an
effort  to return  to old-fashioned  regionalism.  Rather,  it is more  of an
adjustment  process,  following  a  decade  or  more  of  predominantly  extraregional
export  orientation.
Those  same  companies  that  have  achieved  substantial  success  in  exporting
outside  the  region  and  become  competitive  on  the  global  scale,  are  often  also
the  same  ones  which  show  interest  in  getting  access  to  the  regional  market.23
Because  past  experience  has  taught  them  that  trade  is  the  engine  of  growth,  they
have  deduced  that  all  untapped  potential  that  might  increase  trade,  should  be
used  in  order  to  promote  growth.
In  some  cases,  the  regional  market's  demand  for  traditional  labor-  and
material-intensive  products,  which  in  the  past  10-20  years  had  been  exported  to
developed  extraregional  markets,  may  become  more  important,  in  light  of  growing
sectoral  protectionism  in  Lhe  principal  traditional  markets.  More  importantly,
new  trends  towards  regionalization  in  the  world  economy,  the  expected  impact  of
the  single  European  market,  the  transition  to  a  market  economy  in  Eastern  Europe,
and  growing  East-West  economic  interaction,  and  doubts  about  the  strength  (or
viability)  of  longer-term  export-led  development,  will  lead  to  a reassessment
of  the  future  role  of  intraregional  trade.
It should,  however,  be emphasized  that  this  kind  of (partial)  trade
reorientation  is  led  by  national  economies  that  have  successfully  adjusted  to
the  world  economic  environment  and  pursued  and  will  be  pursuing  an  open,  liberal
trade  policy. Intraregional  trade  is  by  far  the  most  important,  both  in  its
share  and  in  value  terms,  for  the  ASEAN  countries  that  were  among  the  champions
of  export-oriented  development  patterns  in  the  last  decade.  In  effect,  it  was
their  global  export  expansion  that  enabled  them  to  increase  lntraregional  trade
despite  a  number  of  barriers.  Similarly,  Brazil's  or  Chile's  export  successes
in  the  region,  as  well  as  Colombia's  good  regional  performance  in  the  1970s,  have
all  been  based  on  previously  achieved  international  competitiveness.
Growing  involvement  by competitive  sectors  and  firms  in intraregional
trade  explains  why  efforts  to  abolish  obstacles  to  this  trade  have  been  gaining
ground  recently.  At  the  end  of  1987,  ASEAN  decided  to  reduce  the  share  of  tariff
items  for sensitive  products  to 10 percent  of total  and 50 percent  of24
intraregional  exports.  The  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  abolished  national  tariffs
in  intraregional  trade  all  at  once  in  1983.  By  September  1988  CARICOM  had  taken
measures  to  remove  all  barriers  restricting  intraregional  trade.  Both  ASEAN  and
CARICOM  promised  that  member  countries  would  not  apply  new  non-tariff  barriers
and  that  they  would  eliminate  the  existing  ones  within  three  (CARICOM)  to  five
(ASEAN)  years.  In order  to support  economic  transparency  and strategic
investment  decisions,  ASEAN  implemented  automatic  annual  tariff  adjustment
schemes  for  10  years.  Most  recently,  LAIA  nations  have  agreed  that  beginning
on  August  1,  1990,  tariff  barriers  on  intraregional  trade  would  be  lowered  and
that  non-tariff  barriers  would  be  eliminated.  ASEAN  has  relaxed  its  rules  of
origin,  now  giving  preferential  treatment  to  products  with  a  local  content  of
35  percent  (rather  than  the  50  percent  required  earlier).
Removal of  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  is  expected  to  increase
intraregional  exports  and,  at  the  same time,  to  improve  the  international
competitiveness  of  the  most efficient  regional  producers.  This  path,  however,
has difficulties  of  its  own.  The elimination  of  barriers  to  intraregional  trade
should not  be accompanied  by  higher  protection  vis-a-vis  third  countries.  In
order  to  allow  for  temporary regional  preferences  it  is  necessary to  make  certain
that  barriers  on  intraregional  trade  are  lower  than  barriers  on  extraregional
partners,  and  not  to  increase  the  level  of  external  protection  in  exchange  for
more  liberal  treatment  of  intraregional  suppliers.
In  addition,  the  liberalization  processes  started  by  national  economies
often  had  different  contents,  time  schedules,  and  gradualism,  leading  to  the
emergence  of  widely  different  tariff  levels,  structures  and  policies  in  the
region. In  order  for  regional  cooperation  to  succeed,  it  is  necessary  that
member  countries  should  adjust  their  trade  policy  and  instruments  to  those  of25
the  most  open  economy  in  the  group.  This,  however,  is  difficult  to  achieve  in
the  short  run,  particularly  when  the  original  differences  among  members  are
great.
B. The  Infrastructural  Approach  to  Regional  Integration
The  classical  trade-oriented  economic  theory  of  regional  integration  sees
regionally  coordinated  development  of  infrastructure  as  an  issue  of  cooperation
rather  than  integration.  Nevertheless,  it  was  the  previously  created  joint
infrastructure  and  the  network  of  institutional  services  that  gave  birth  to  some
RIDCs  after  colonial  rule  (the  former  East  African  Common  Market,  CARICOM).
Growing  disintegration  processes  fueled  by  diverging  national  economic  policies
and  political  interests  eliminated  or  substantially  changed  most  of  these  common
activities.  At the  same  time,  new  initiatives  based  on the  common  natural
infrastructure  and  its  planned  joint  utilization,  emerged  (Mano  River  Union,
River  Plate  Group).
There  are  several  reasons  to  explain  why  there  have  been  few  attempts  In
the  last  two  decades  to  create  or  improve  the  regional  infrastructure.  Lack  of
financial  resources,  negative  experiences  with  earlier  joint  projects  that  proved
to  be  very  expensive,  Inefficient  and  sometimes  chronically  underutilized  (yet
growing)  extraregional  trade  orientation,  help  explain  this  behavior.  Also,  the
modest  and  often  falling  volumes  of  intraregional  trade  and  economic  relations
could  not usually  be handled  by the  previously  established  infrastructural
network.
In recent  years,  however,  practically  all  regional  groups  have  become
increasingly  interested  in  infrastructural  cooperation.  These  new  groups  view
joint  infrastructural  development  as  a  priority  area  of  cooperation.  Three  main26
factors  support  this  change  of mind:  (1)  the failure  of trade-centered
Integration  is  partly  attributed  to  the  lack  or  feeble  condition  of  regional
infrastructure;  (2)  international  experience  shows  that  high  growth  rates,
structural  changes,  and  increasing  international  competitiveness  are,  to  a  large
extent,  based  on well-designed  and long-term  investment  and development
strategies  in  different  areas  of  physical  and  human  infrastructure;  (3)  lessons
drawn  from recent  national  adjustment  and restructuring  policies  clearly
demonstrate  that  their  success  or  failure  was  closely  related  to  the  availability
of  an  efficient  infrastructure.
Arguments  in  favor  of  regionally  coordinated  infrastructural  development
can  be  classified  in  three  main  groups:  financial,  trade-related,  and  socio-
political.
The  financial  arguments  emphasize  that  a  number  of  Infrastructural  projects
are  extremely  costly,  at  least  compared  to  the  sometimes  very  modest  economic,
technical,  and  financial  resources  available  in  national  budgets.  Therefore,
the  combining  of  regional  resources  is  essential.  In  several  cases,  regional
demand  can  be  met  by  establishing  only  one  efficiently  utilized  project  instead
of  a number  of fragmented  national  projects.  In  this  way,  duplications  and
substantial  underutilization  of  infrastructural  capacities  can  be  avoided.  Also,
national  infrastructural  development  plans  can  be  coordinated  in  order  to  support
a  comprehensive  regional  development.  In  sum,  development  costs  can  be  minimized
and  competitiveness  increased.  As  an  additional  argument,  regionally  coordinated
development  projects  are  expected  to  attract  external  financing  more  easily  and
in larger  volumes  than  national  projects. Therefore,  a part  of national
(regional)  resources  can  be  devoted  to  other  pursuits.27
Trade-related  arguments  differentiate  between  the  direct  and indirect
positive  impacts  of developing  infrastructure.  According  to widespread
experience,  1nfrastructural  underdevelopment  led  to  high  transportation  costs
that  made  intraregional  trade  non-competitive.  The  newly  constructed  railway
between  Argentina  and  Brazil  Is  expected  to  double  the  transportation  capacity,
accompanied  by  a  substantial  saving  In  time  and  a  40  per  cent  reduction  of  costs.
A  lack  of  infrastructure  is  also  a  barrier  to  national  economic  integration  in
many  countries.  In  turn,  a  developed  infrastructural  background  is  essential
in  order  to  create  trade.  One  the  one  hand,  lower  transaction  costs  and  better
opportunities  for  intraregional  division  of  labor  Improve  competitiveness  in  all
markets.  On the other,  exports  to extraregional  markets  may require
infrastructural  developments  that,  for  geographic  reasons,  may  involve  more  than
one  member  country.  For  example,  the  opening  up  in  May  1983  of the  trans-
Mediterranean  pipeline  enabled  Algerian  gas  to  be  transported  to  Italy  through
Tunisia.
Improved  conditions  for  trade  produce  a  chain  reaction.  Through  trade,
more information  on previously  unknown  factors  becomes  available. This
information  may  influence  business  decisions  and  even  promote  additional  trade
and  economic  links.  For  instance,  as  contacts  between  buyer  and  seller  become
regular,  information  on  the  size  and  pattern  of  demand  and  specific  features
influencing  demand  (e.g.  taste)  in other  member  countries  will  be widely
available.  Also,  development  plans  will  increasingly  consider  the  available
infrastructural  background,  and  new  development  poles  in  the  region  are  likely
to  be  created  along  the  regional  "infrastructural  backbone".  The  unfolding
confidence-building  process  may strengthen  the "integration  capability'  of
regional  groups.  This  is  particularly  important,  considering  that  in  several28
regional  integrations,  high  transaction  costs  resulted  in  such  a  high  level  of
competitive  disadvantage  that  could  not  be  compensated  for  even  by  substantial
regional  trade  preferences.  Low  transaction  costs  (as  in  ASEAN)  can  pave  the
way for closer  economic  integration  without  making  any progress  in the
institutional  integration  schemes  (Amelung,  1990).
Socio-political  arguments  emphasize  the  role  of  cultural  affinity  among
neighboring  countries  and  the  advantages  resulting  from  the  better  understanding
of  each  other's  aims,  reactions,  opportunities,  and  limits.  Cooperation  in  the
development  of  human  resources  (e.  g.  education,  training,  research)  is  expected
to  contribute  to  the  elimination  of  political  hostility.  Similar  educational
roots  and  mentality  may  help  develop  an  influential  group  favoring  regional
cohesion.  For  landlocked  member  countries  particularly,  the  improvement  of  the
infrastructural  network  helps  lower  unilateral  dependence  on  the  country  that
controls  the  key  export  and  import  channels,  and  information  centers.  This  was
the  main  reason  why  SADCC  identified  joint  transportation  and  telecommunication
projects  as  priority  areas  of  cooperation.  Also,  cooperation  in  human  resource
development  may  alleviate  the  brain  drain  situation,  which  deprives  developing
countries  of  valuable  development  resources.
Infrastructural  cooperation  is  generally  based  on identical  or similar
features  of  natural  and  economic  geography  in  the  (neighboring)  member  countries.
In  most  groups,  there  are  at  least  some  member  countries  which  have  similar  soil
and  climatic  conditions,  environmental  and  geological  structures,  and  belong  to
the  same  river  system.  Their  populations  often  speak  the  same  language  and  this
makes  educational  cooperation  much  easier  to achieve  (see  earlier  attempts
between  Colombia,  Ecuador  and  Peru  in  the  Andean  Group).29
Areas  of  practical  cooperation  include  a wide  scope  of activities  that
have  been  growing  in  number  and  variety  in  the  last  few  years.  In  general  terms,
there  has been a shift  from "hardware"  cooperation  (developing  physical
infrastructure)  to  "software"  cooperation  (concentrating  on  human  resources).
This  is  partly  explained  by  the  sometimes  chronically  underutilized  and  costly
inherited  physical  infrastructure  which  never  handled  the  volume  of  intraregional
trade  that  it  was  meant  to.  Another  reason  is the  growing  importance  of
"software"  in  infrastructural  development  on  a  global  scale.
Joint  transportation  projects  that  previously  concentrated  on  creating
new  highways,  ports,  and  frequently  inefficient  joint  regional  transportation
companies,  have  started  in  recent  years,  to  give  priority  to  the  improvement  of
maintenance  of existing  facilities  and  to harmonize  nationlal  transport  apd
traffic  rules  (technical  standards,  environmental  requirements,  tranisport  tariffs
and  schedules,  contract  laws,  etc.).
In  the  field  of  energy  cooperation,  there  is  recently  less  emphasis  placed
on eneigy  production.  In  the  past,  this  was  responsible  for  creating  vast
(hydroelectric)  production  capacities  for  regional  markets  that  were  unlikely,
in the foreseeable  future,  to absorb  the potential  output.  In turn,  the
establishment  of  a  joint  regional  energy  network  emerged  as  a  prospective  field
of  cooperation.  According  to  the  Latin  American  Energy  Organization  (OLADE),
member  countries  suffered  on  average  a  25  percent  power  loss  (almost  double  the
technically  accepted  level)  as  a consequence  of insufficient  integration  of
national  energy-producing  capabilities.  The  interconnection  of  national  energy
systems,  assistance  in  energy-related  emergencies,  and  harmonization  of  technical
standards  could  result  in  substantial  savings  of energy. Simultaneously,  a30
promising  new  market  for  energy-generating  machinery  could  be created,  with
beneficial  impacts  on  intraregional  trade  (Sanchez  and  Sierra,  1988).
Dramatic  changes  in  worldwide  information  technologies  and  international
deregulation  of related  services  prodded  member  countries  to create  Joint
information  and  telecommunications  networks.  In  the  last  few  years,  also  joint
protection  by  neighboring  countries  of  the  rapidly  deteriorating  environment  has
become  a  priority  task.
To  some  extent,  the  development  of  physical  infrastructure  has  a  particular
impact  on  border  areas  within  regional  integrations  and  stresses  the  need  for
increased  "border  integration".  It is  obvious  that  some  border  areas  have
substantial  development  potential,  both  for  the  national  economies  involved  and
for  the  regional  integration  (geological  resources,  irrigation  for  agricultural
purposes,  water  supply,  etc.).  National  territories  previously  hard  to  reach
or completely  inaccessible  may  now  be organically  linked  to the  respective
national  economies.  At  the  same  time,  intraregional  trade  can  be  expanded.  As
an  additional  advantage,  cooperation  in  border  areas  offers  the  possibility  of
easing  political  tensions  and  conflicts  that  once  had  an adverse  impact  on
regional  cooperation  and  integration.
The  idea  of  joint  development  of  human  infrastructure  is  supported  by  cost
and  capacity  utilization  reasons.  The  implementation  of  specific  training  on
the regional  level (in such areas  as meteorology,  air traffic,  customs
procedures,  computer  programming,  industrial  and  financial  management,  medical
technology,  etc.),  may  be  very  costly  or  impossible  to  implement  by  individual
member  countries.  The  cverall  improvement  of  regional  information  flows,  with
special  emphasis  on activities  involving  intraregional  trade  and  cooperation
(aims  and  instruments  of  regional  integration,  competition  rules,  bureaucratic31
procedures,  customs  and  tax  administration,  public  procurement,  evaluation  of
investment  bids  in  member  countries)  is  expected  to  contribute  to i.'proved
intraregional  trade  and economic  relations. Regional  trade  promotion  and
information  centers,  joint  fairs  and expositions,  closer  contacts  between
national  industrial  and  economic  chambers  and  entrepreneurs,  and  factory  visits
may  also  strengthen  the  commitment  of a well-trained  and  informed  group  to
regional  cooperation.
Collective  technological  development  projects,  as  harmonization  of  national
standards,  dissemination  amongst  group  members  of  new  technologies,  joint  access
to technologies  developed  in third  countries  offer  wide  opportunities  for
regional  cooperation.  As  an  example,  Argentina  and  Brazil  opted  for  joint  nuclear
research  activities  supported  by  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Also
health  related  issues  (birth  control,  improving  hygienic  conditions,  immunization
campaigns,  etc.)  may  be  considered  when  potential  areas  of  regional  cooperation
are  to  be  identified.
This  ambitious  list  notwithstanding,  regional  cooperation  in  infrastructural
development  has  its  obvious  limits.  Therefore,  regional  projects  have  to  be
analyzed  carefully,  and  their  costs  and  benefits  have  to  be  compared  with  those
inherent  in  a  national  framework  or  extraregional  cooperation.
Transportation  costs grow with geographic  distance,  and therefore
intraregional  trade,  at  least  theoretically,  may  have  a  cost  advantage.  However,
the  cost  structure  is  made  up  of  different  components,  whose  particular  costs
do  not  change  equally  with  growing  distance.  In  the  area  of  sea  transport,  for
example,  fixed  costs  (terminal  costs)  are  much  higher  than  freight  rates.  The
smaller  the  distance,  the  greater  the  specific  transport  costs.  Therefore,
intraregional  trade  among  island  economies  (CARICOM,  Philippines  in  ASEAN)  does32
not  have  any  meaningful  transportation  cost  advantage,  even  when  other  conditions
for  intra-  and  extraregional  trade  are  the  same  (although  this  is  unlikely).
First,  intraregional  trade  is  usually  less  important  than  extraregional  trade.
As  a result,  the  smaller  volume  of  goods  traded  in  the  region  can  easily  have
higher  specific  transport  costs  than  higher  volumes  of  goods  exported  outside
the  region.  Second,  cost  increasing  factors,  such  as  insurance,  communication
capabilities,  quality  of related  services,  delays  in customs  procedures,
connecting  transportation  facilities,  etc.,  differ  widely  from  country  to
country.  Sometimes  there  is  no  national  company  in  the  region  capable  of  offering
these  services  comprehensively  or  guaranteeing  competitive  quality  work.  This
is  due,  in  part,  to  the  sophisticated  character  and  human  and  physical  capital-
intensity  of the  services  provided. Third,  the inefficiencies  of national
(frequently  state-owned)  monopolies  --  which have been protected  from
international  competition  for  decades,  and  may  still  be  protected  --  may  be  a
substantial  cost-increasing  factor.
Intraregional  transportation  cost  advantages  also  depend  on the  goods
traded.  In  the  export  of  transportation-intensive  products  (semi-manufactured
bulk  products,  raw  materials)  intraregional  trade  may  be  higher  than  average.
However,  similar  production  and export  structures,  fundamental  differences
between  export  volumes  and  the  size  of  the  regional  market,  and  frequently  highly
protected  national  markets  may  prevent  countries  from  taking  full  advantage  of
these  potential  benefits.
The  potential  advantages  of  intraregional  infrastructural  development  may
be  further  diminished  by  the  rapidly  growing  deregulation  of  services  on  the
international  scale. In  par.tcular,  extremely  costly  developments  may  occur33
when  regional  projects  do not  take  into  account  the sometimes  dramatically
decreasing  costs  of  international  services  (e.  g.  In  telecommunications).
Regional  infrastructural  development  possibilities  are  further  constrained
by the huge  amount  of financial  resources  that  have  to be mobilized.  For
instance,  SADCC  presented  more  than  150  infrastructural  projects  with  a  total
cost  of more  than  US$ 3bn  to be financed  by the international  conmnunity.
Resources  are  generally  scarce  during  the  stabilization  and  adjustment  process,
and resource  reallocation  priorities  are usually  different  from  financing
regional  projects.  There  is  an  urgent  need  for  finding  high-profit  investment
possibilities  with  rapid  return.  This  requirement  clearly  contrasts  with  the
nature  of  large  infrastructural  projects  that  pay  off  only  after  a  greater  period
of time has elapsed.  This problem  calls  for substantial  international
cooperation.
Obviously,  regionally  developed  projects  can  be  less  costly  than  national
ones.  Yet,  this  cost  advantage,  by  itself,  does  not  cause  intraregional  trade
to  increase  unless  the  member  countries'  economic  and  trade  policies  also  create
an  attractive  environment  for  higher  trade  flows. The  lack  of financial  and
political  confidence  may  also  undermine  otherwise  rational  economic  decisions,
The  foreign  exchange  risk  of  import-intensive,  joint  developments  is  substantial
for  countries  having  inconvertible  national  currencies  and  facing  major  or
continuous  devaluations.  Sudden  and  unpredictable  political  changes  in  one  or
more  contracting  countries  may  rearrange  economic  priorities  and  may  cause  some
countries'  interest  in  going  on  with  joint  projects  to  lessen  or  to  disappear
altogether.  Uncertainties  are  even  greater  if,  as  often  happens,  international
laws  are  not  recognized,  and  thus  not  applicable,  against  violators  of  contracts.34
Experience  has shown that one of the major obstacles  to regional
infrastructural  development  is  the  uncertainty  about  the  equitable  distribution
of expected  or actual  benefits.  The  main  concern  is generally  not how  to
distribute  financial  resources  but rather  where  regional  projects  will  be
located.  In  capital-intensive  physical  infrastructure  projects,  the  national
territory  principle  may  be  applied,  while  most  human  resource  developments  have
relatively  modest  capital  requirement.  This  is  a  highly  sensitive  issue  both
in  the  external  and  the  domestic  policy  game.
In  the  foreign  policy  context,  disagreement  centers  around  national  prestige
considerations  (e.g.  f'ustrated  efforts  to create  a regional  airline  of  the
Maghreb  countries  by  combining  existing  national  ones).  Also,  concerns  about  one-
sided  dependence  may  cause  countries  to  hesitate.  For  example,  Country  A is
contributing  to  the  current  expenses  of  a  joint  establishment  (institution)  but
it  cannot  control  the  general  environment  in  Country  B, in  which  the  joint
establishment  operates.  Adverse  economic  trends  or  sudden  political  changes  may
lead  to  the  disruption  of  regional  activities.  (A  regional  Rice  Institute  is  well
functioning  in  the  Philippines  and  failed  in  Ibadan,  West  Africa.)  In  addition,
it is  feared  that  countries  having  regional  institutions  may  have  increased
bargaining  power  against  member  countries  that  do  not  possess  such  projects.  The
longer-term  and most evident  issue  is, however,  the expected  or virtual
multiplier  effect  of  the  location.  Countries  or  cities  being  able  to  attract
regional  organizations  and  institutions  may  have  better  development  prospects.
They  generally  get  more  foreign  capital  and  resources;  the  growing  and  usually
well-paid  international  professional  manpower  generates  higher  demand  for  goods
and  labor  alike,  with  positive  impact  on general  growth  prospects;  and  host35
countries  with inconvertible  national  currency  enjoy  a growing  inflow  of
convertible  assets.  In  sum,  intraregional  differences  may  become  more  manifest.
Regarding  the  domestic  policy  setting,  the streamlining  of previously
inefficient  institutions  and  projects  on  the  national  level  may  produce  strong
opposition  by  that  part  of  the  national  bureaucracy  which  is  in  danger  of  losing
its  influence  and  perhaps  even  its  job.
Thus,  in  some  cases,  coordination  of  national  infrastructural  development
may  produce  less  tension.  However,  this  results  in  underutilized  capacities,
overlapping  activities  and,  as  a  consequence,  high  costs  of  functioning.  Formal
regional  institutions,  as  suggested  for  the  CARICOM  (Policy  Options...,  1990),
may  offer  an in-between  solution,  at least  in  areas  where  sufficient  local
technical  and  managerial  knowledge  has  been  accumulated  (University  of  West
Indies  Faculty  of Agriculture  and the  Caribbean  Agricultural  Research  and
Development  Institute).  Gradual  harmonization  is likely  to be achieved  by
following  this  path.  Certainly,  this  approach  has  very  little  in  common  with
earlier  ambitious  "prestige"  projects,  but  it  prevents  huge  misallocations  of
scarce  resources  and  helps  strengthen  the  mlcroeconomic  foundations  of  regional
cooperation  and  international  competitiveness.
C.  Joint  Activities  vis-a-vis  Third  Countries
The  concept  of  joint,  integration  level  protection  of  the  member  countries'
economic  interests  against  adverse  or  changing  international  economic
developments  is  not  a  genuine  product  of RIDC. In  the  1970s,  more  than  one
attempt  was  made  by  differently  composed  groups  of  developing  countries  --  within
the  framework  of  a "new  world  economic  order"  --  to  redistribute  or  at  least
regulate  the  advantages  (and  disadvantages)  produced  by  international  economic36
developments.  These  experiments  failed.  hoviever,  partly  because  common  interest
in  changes  or  economic  strength  required  to  implement  changes  remained  below  the
critical  mass.  Also,  quick  adjustments  and economic  policy  responses  by
developed  countries,  as  well  as  dramatically  changing  world  economic  priorities,
raised  questions  about  the  viability  of  these  efforts.
Trade  policy  approaches  on  the  regional  level  were  more  successful.  The
unified  external  economic  policy  of  the  EC,  after  1975,  played  a  catalytic  role.
On the  one  hand,  as  Brussels  started  to  negotiate  trade  policy  issues  as a
regional  integration,  it  provided  an  example  to  be  followed  by  other  regional
integrations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  building-up  of  a  pyramid  of  privileges
induced  third  countrieW  'heir  groups  to  try  to  obtain  the  best  position  on
the  ladder  of  trade  p.  as  or,  at  least,  to  avoid  slipping  back  into  non-
preferential  status.
Group-to-group  negotiations  were  conducted  with  African  countries  from  as
early  as  the  1960s.  After  the  first  enlargement  of  the  EC,  the  Lomb  Convention
gathered  countries  that  belonged  to  various  integration  schemes  in  Africa  and
the  Caribbean.  Regular  meetings  made  it  possible  for  developing  countries
belonging  to  the  same  Integration  to  get  better  acquainted  with  each  other's
position  and interests.  As a result,  they  agreed  on a system  of limited
cooperation  that  did  not  bring  progress  in  intraregional  affairs  but  offered
trade  and  other  economic  advantages  vis-a-vis  the  powerful  European  Community.
Later  on,  the  EC  concluded  trade  agreements  with  other  integrations  such  as
ASEAN,  CACM,  and  the  Andean  Pact.  Most  of  them  did  not  go  beyond  providing  GSP
treatment,  but  in  some  cases,  by recognizing  cumulative  (regional)  rules  of
origin  and  setting  regional  import  quotas  for  certain  products,  they  improved
market  access  for  exporters.  Moreover,  thesc  agreements  called  for  cooperation37
In infrastructure,  food  aid,  export  promotion,  and protection  of foreign
investment.
A second,  although  far  less  important  reason  for  taking  a  joint  position
was political.  In 1967,  ASEAN  was established  in order  to protect  member
countries  from  foreign  military  threat  and  stabilize  a  geographic  area  that  was
vitally  important  for  Asian  (and  global)  security.  Economic  cooperation  within
the  group  started  only  after  1976.
Five  of  the  RIDCs'  potential  areas  of  joint  external  economic  activity  can
be  identified:
1.  Increasing  the  bargaining  power  of  a  region  in  international  trade
negotiations.  This  includes  protection  of  traditional  export  markets
and products,  tariff  preferences  for the whole  region,  higher
regional  export  quotas  for  various  sensitive  products,  and the
recognition  of  regional  rules  of  origin.  In  a certain  sense,  this
is a specific  trade  creation function  of regional  integration,
because  the  negotiated  preferential  conditions  offer  some  advantages
to  the  members  of  the  group,  as  compared  to  other  exporters.  It  is
hardly  surprising  that  ASEAN,  the  integration  with  the  most  world
economy-oriented  countries,  exhibits  a  very  dynamic  trade  diplomacy.
It  signed  trade  agreements  with  six  partners,  all  from  the  developed
world  (EC,  USA,  Japan,  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand).  Clearly,
ASEAN's  significant  bargaining  power  is  first  of  all  due  to  rapid
economic  growth,  outward-looking  economic  policies  and growing
integration  into  the  world  economy,  and not  to closer  regional
Integration.38
2.  Few  experiments  have  been  undertaken  to  shape  common  export  policies
on  the  regional  level.  These  efforts  have  focused  on  protecting  the
member  countries'  export  markets  for  similat  or  identical  products.
So  far,  four  LAIA  countries  have  agreed  to  support  clothing  exports
to  outside  markets,  and  since  1980,  ASEAN's  Association  of  Textile
Industries  has  been  formulating  common  positions  on  MFA  negotiations.
Recently,  the  CACM  has  formulated  plans  for  promoting  regional
exports,  without  specifying,  however,  its  instruments.
3.  Regionally  coordinated  imports  of raw  materials  and  other  bulk
products  may  offer  better  purchasing  terms  (price,  after-purchase-
services)  and  shared  transportation  and  insurance  costs.  However,
underdeveloped  regional  infrastructure,  different  geographic
orientation  of  the  member  countries,  and  relatively  small  regional
demand  may  substantially  limit  the  volume  of  potential  savings.
4.  More  recently,  common  activities  emerged  in  order  to  attract  higher
volumes  of  external  financial  resources.  By  1988,  SADCC  could  ensure
external  financing  for  20  industrial  projects,  and  is  now  working
on  getting  additional  resources  for  11 more  projects.  The  ASEAN  Fund
of  US$5  billion,  provided  by  Japan,  is  scheduled  to  finance  regional
projects  in  the  private  sector  and  in  indusstrial  upgrading.  The  EC
also  contributes  to  regional  development  in  ASEAN,  although  in  a  very
modest  way.39
5.  Modest  direct,  but  probably  much  more  important  indirect  impacts
are  expected  from  actions  promoting  trade  and  cooperation  among  a
region's  entrepreneurs.  These  actions  may  include  the  creation  of
regional  marketing  boards,  conferences  on industrial  cooperation
and  joint  ventures,  organization  of  trade  missions  and  expositions,
and  establishment  of  the  microeconomic  infrastructure  of  business
cooperation  (business  councils,  regional  economic  and  commercial
chambers,  regional  standardization  and  quality  control  centers,
training  and  management  facilities).  More  attention  is  being  given
to  the  support  of  small-  and  medium-sized  private  companies.  Regional
banks  may  play  an important  role  in  financing  the  institutional
framework  of  regional  firm-level  cooperation.
It  is  expected  that  the  common  position  regarding  the  external  world  is
going  to  become  a  major  element  of  integration-level  strategies  in  the  coming
years.  The  emerging  Single  European  Market  and  the  regionalization  tendencies
of other  parts  of the  world  require  adequate  responses  and  sometimes  even
substantial  policy  changes  from  developing  countries  (Basdeo,  1990;  Brmne,  1990;
Rainford,  1990).
Developing  countries  are  likely  to  face  more  and  qualitatively  different
challenges  coming  from  the  EC  in  the  next  years  than  at  any  other  time  since
its  founding,  in  1957.  In  the  early  1960s,  imitation  of  the  EC  measures  was
limited  to  trade  liberalization,  which,  given  the  RIDCs'  markedly  different
economic  environment,  usually  ended  up  in  failure.  At  present,  the  world  economy
is  much  more  open  and  deregulated  than  30  years  ago. Economic  interdependence
has  become  an  everyday  occurrence.  Moreover,  the  creation  of  the  Single  Market40
has  a comprehensive  set  of  goals  and  instruments  that  go  far  beyond  trade  and
also  include  the  free  movement  of  services,  capital,  and  manpower.
In  contrast  to  the  1960s,  when  different  viable  options  were  available,
today  there  is  hardly  any  other  reasonable  alternative  than  adjustment  to  the
requirements  of  the  largest  market  in  the  world  economy.  While,  in  earlier
times,  economic  marginalization  of  countries  and  groups  of  countries  was  the
consequence  of self-chosen  and failed  economic  policies,  in the 1990s
marginalization  may  be  involuntary  and  imposed  by  powerful  international  economic
developments.  Deregulation  and regionalization,  as parallel  and decisive
international  processes,  are  likely  to  affect  all  countries  that  cannot  forge
stronger  economic  alliances,  not  just  among  themselves  but  also  with  one  or  more
of  the  major  centers  of  world  economic  and  technological  growth.
The  common  position  of  RIDCs  will  be  challenged  in  three  main  areas:
First,  the  establishment  of  the  single  market  and  the  gradual  Integration
of the reforming  Central  and  Eastern  European  economies  into  the (Western)
European  network  of economic  cooperation  substantially  modifies  Brussels'
previously  established  pyramid  of  trade  and  economic  preferences.  As  a  result,
those  regional  integrations,  whose  vital  economic  interests  are  likely  to  be
damaged,  will  engage  in  joint  actions  and  will  do  their  best  to  protect  their
privileges.  However,  it  is  unlikely  that  they  will  be  able  to  maintain  most  of
their  earlier  privileges.  First  of all,  African  integrations  whose  member
countries  participate  in  the  Lomd  Convention,  as  well  as  CARICOM  and  Maghreb,
may  have  to  face  strong  challenges  as  (a)  the  preferential  import  regime  will
be  diluted,  (b)  national  import  quotas  eliminated,  (c)  competition  stiffened,
(d)  the  common  agricultural  policy  transformed,  (e)  Spain's  and Portugal's
accession  completed,  (f)  new  association  treaties  with  some  Central  and  Eastern41
European  countries  concluded  and  (g)  migration  possibilities  strictly  controlled.
In  addition,  progress  on  the  road  to  monetary  union  will  send  serious  shocks  to
the  currency  integration  of  the  CFA  zone  with  the  likely  outcome  of  ending  with
the  system  of fixed  exchange  rates  and  perhaps  also  with  the  present  form  of
UDEAC  or  ECOWAS.
The second  challenge  may have  a fundamentally  creative  impact.  The
unfolding  large  and  dynamic  European  market  will  be  developing  a  number  of  new
opportunities  for  third  countries.  For  economies  of  scale  reasons,  and  due  to
keener  competition,  most  of  the  potential  advantages  are  likely  to  be  used  only
if  scarce  national  resources  are  put  together.  In  this  way,  the  single  market
is expected  to increase  regional  cooperation  in those  areas  where  better
extraregional  export  possibi  ities  are  offered  or  where  unified  regional  services
(e.  g.  tourism)  may  attract  growing  demand  from  Europe.  Success  in  agribusiness
or  winning  bids  on  the  market  of  public  procurement  may  forcefully  push  national
companies  to  regional  mergers  and  help  create  regional  multinational  firms.  The
EC's  standardization  and  harmonization  of  technical,  health,  and  environmental
regulations  will  necessarily  force different  national  rules  to  be  harmonized
and ad'  sted to international  standards.  This, in turn, is not only a
precondition  of  maintaining  traditional  or  conquering  new  markets  but  it  may  also
have  a favorable  impact  on regional  harmonization  that  could  not  have  been
achieved  through  pressure  by  relatively  weak  regional  lobbies  and  institutions.
A  third  factor  is  that  the  spread  of  regional  preferential  zones  with  the
participation  of the  major  economic  powers,  exerts  an integrative  impact  on
RIDCs.  It  is  clear  that  the  strengthening  of  regional  integration,  as  a  defiant
response  to  regionalization  trends  in  the  main  export  markets,  is  a  blind  alley
for  economically  less  developed  and  poorer  groups  of  countries.  However,  stronger42
regional  links,  as  part  of  continent-wide  approaches,  may  promise  more  success.
As  a first  reaction  to  the  EC  '92  program,  the  US-Canada  free  trade  agreement
and  the  rapidly  changing  political  and  economic  environment  of  intra-European
relations,  several  regional  integrations  have  reconsidered  or  are  now  pondering
the  potential  of  regional  cooperation.  Most  recently,  even  the  temporary  failure
of  GATT  negotiations  immediately  strengthened  this  kind  of potential  policy
response.  Looking  at the Bush initiative,  intraregional  trade could  be
substantially  accelerated  in  LAIA.  The  Maghreb  countries  recently  concluded  that
unified  tariffs  on  imports  should  be  introduced  by  1991 and  full  customs  union
by  1995.  On  the  regional  level,  conditions  for  attracting  more  foreign  direct
capital  should  also  be  improved  on  the  regional  level.
Some  regional  groups  are  planning  to  link  intra-group  trade  liberalization
to  strengthening  economic  links  with  one  or  more  of  the  leading  economic  powers.
Maghreb  and  GCC  wish  free  trade  pacts  with  the  EC.  The  CACM  proposed  to  negotiate
a  preferential  trade  agreement,  similar  to  the  Lomb  Convention,  with  the  EC,  and
wishes  to  extend  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  launched  by  the  United  States,
to  Central  American  exports  to  the  US  market.  There  is  a  growing  understanding
among  Latin  American  governments  that  the  free  trade  area  that  at  the  moment
includes  the  United  States  and  Canada  and  is  planned  to  be  extended  to  Mexico,
should  cover  the  whole  Western  Hemisphere.  ASEAN  member  countries  are  examining
the  viability  of  an  Asia-Pacific  trading  bloc.  Regional  integrations  with  the
most  limited  internal  resources  (CARICOM)  try  to  establish  relations  with  larger
neighboring  groups  (LAIA).  As  a  most  recent  development,  Mexico  and  the  member
countries  of  CACM  signed  an  agreement  leading  to  free  trade  by  1997.
African  integration  schemes  seem  to  be  in  the  least  encouraging  position
and  much  of  the  continent  seems  to  be  on  the  losing  side  in  the  unfolding  world43
of trading  blocs.  Most  member  countries  of different  regional  groups  are
unilaterally  dependent  on  the  EC  whence  strong  economic  impacts  threatening  the
previously  achieved  preferential  trade  advantages  are  expected  to  come  after
1992.  It  is  a  poor  consolation  that  most  of  the  preferences  enjoyed  in  the  past
by  African  economies  were  used  relatively  inefficiently  anyway.  At  the  moment,
there  are  no  alternative  dynamic  partners  on the  horizon. Thus,  it is  not
surprising  that  arguments  in  43vor  of  warming  up  old  and  frustrated  regional
integration  schemes  have  been  gaining  ground  recently  (Asante,  1990).
IV. Conclusions
Economic  integration  among developing  countries  (based  on  import
substitution  on the  regional  level)  fell  far  short  of initial  expectations.
Although  at first  intraregional  trade  increased  in some  trading  groups,  it
remained  a  rather  modest  share  of  total  trade,  it  had  a  tendency  to  decline  in
the  1970s,  and  stagnated  in  most  of  the  1980s. In  addition,  ambitious  plans
for  joint  industrialization  could  not  be  implemented.
The  reasons  for  failure  were  partly  predetermined  by  the  heritage  of  most
member  countries:  small  size  of  the  market,  low  level  of  economic,  industrial
and  infrastructural  development,  similar  production  and  export  patterns,  and
different  political  and  economic  policy  orientation.  Additional  problems  emerged
during  the implementation  of the  main  objectives.  Trade  liberalization  was
blocked  or substantially  slowed  down,  highly  protective  barriers  to trade
remained  untouched  or  were  harmonized  on  the  regional  level,  and  controversy
about  the  distribution  of  gains  and  losses  could  not  be  settled  in  a  satisfactory
way.  Dramatic  changes  in  the  world  economy  further  affected  the  environment  for
regional  integration  and  cooperatiun.  Different  countries  were  affected  in44
different  ways,  and  each  one  reacted  differently  to  the  situation,  and  sometimes
substantially  different  national  economic  policies  were  produced.
Despite  generally  negative  experiences,  new approaches  to regional
cooperation  started  to  reemerge  in  recent  years.  Attempts  to  revitalize  dormant
regional  groups,  to  form  new  blocs  and  to  set  partly  new  priorities  are  on  the
increase.  Although  trade  remains  the most important  element  of the new
initiatives,  fundamental  changes  have  taken  place  in  the  assessment  of the
possibilities  and  limits  of regional  integration,  as  compared  with  the  basic
concepts  in  the  1960s.
Stabilization  and  adjustment  policies  have  created  more  open,  export-
oriented,  liberal  and  competitive  economies.  Higher  exports  generated  higher
growth  and  regional  demand.  Industrial  restructuring  improved  competitiveness,
attracted  international  capital  and  technology,  and  opened  up  areas  of  intra-
industrial  division  of  labor.  Export-oriented  economies  proved  competitive  not
only  in  extraregional  but  also  increasingly  in  intraregional  markets.  In  most
cases,  it  was not the regional  training  ground  that  created  international
competitiveness,  but the successful  outward-looking  policies  that  enhanced
competitiveness  within  the  region.  In  addition,  the  strengthening  of  the  private
sector  and  closer  cooperation  in  infrastructural  develepment  (mostly  the  more
efficient  utilization  of  human  resources,  as  identified  earlier  in  this  paper)
support  the  shaping  of  an  environment  in  which  new  opportunities  for  enhanced
regional  trade  may  be  created.  Obviously,  intraregional  trade  cannot  become  an
alternative  to  fundamentally  world  market-oriented  trade  flows.  However,  in  the
1990s,  intraregional  trade  and  economic  relations  are  likely  to  grow  parallel
to,  or  even  at  a  higher  rate  than  extraregional  contacts.45
The  formation  of new,  powerful  economic  and  trading  blocs,  such  as the
single  market  of  the  EC,  the  US-Canada  free  trade  area,  initiatives  in the
Pacific  basin,  and  the  transition  to  market  economies  in  Central  (and  perhaps
Eastern)  Europe,  seem  to  foster  trends  towards  a  new  regionalism  in  the  world
economy.  The virtual  failure  of the GATT negotiations  may speed  up this
development.  In  order  to  minimize  economic  losses  and  to  avoid  marginalization,
regional  groups  of  developing  countries  will  be  increasingly  forced  to  work  out
common  positions  and  to  join  one  of  the  influential  groups.  Both  factors  require
the  gradual  yet  rapid  dismantling  of  barriers  to  the  free  flow  of  production
factors  within  regional  integrations.46
Annex
List  of  Major  Regional  Integrations
Andean  Pact  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  Venezuela
ASEAN  Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations  (Brunel,  Indonesia,
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand)
CACM  Central  American  Common  Market  (Costa  Rica,  El Salvador,
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua)
CARICOM  Caribbean  Common  Market  (Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Barbados,  Bel  Ize,
Dominica,  Grenada,  Guyana,  Jamaica,  Montserrat,  St.  Kitts  and
Nevis,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent,  Trinidad  and  Tobago)
EC  European  Communities  (Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,
Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Portugal,
Spain,  United  Kingdom)
ECOWAS  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States (Benin,  Burkina
Faso,  Cape  Verde,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Ivory
Coast,  Liberia,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Senegal,
Sierra  Leone,  Togo)
EFTA  European  Free  Trade  Association  (Austria,  Finland,  Iceland,
Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland)
GCC  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi
Arabia,  United  Arab  Emirates)
LAIA  Latin  American  Integration  Association  (Argentina,  Bolivia,
Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Paraguay,  Peru,
Uruguay,  Venezuela)
Maghreb  Arab  Maghreb  Union  (Algeria,  Libya,  Mauritania,  Morocco,  Tunisia)
SADCC-PTA  South  African  Development  Coordination  Conference  (Angola,
Botswana,  Lesotho,  Malawl,Mozambique,  Swaziland,  Tanzania,
Zambia,Zimbabwe)  and  Preferential  Trade  Area  of Eastern  and
Southern  African  States  (members  of  SADCC,  minus  Angola,  plus
Burundi,  Comoros,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Mauritius,  Rwanda,  Somalia)47
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Table  1: SELECTED  INTEGRATION  GROUPS:  BASIC  INDICATORS
(1988)
Population  GNP GNP  per Imports  Imports
head  per  head
millions  $bn  $  $bn  $
LAIA  368  735.8  1999  67,1  182
ASEAN  309  227.2  735  102.1  330
ECOWAS  188  64.7  344  11.4  x/  62  x/
SADCC-PTA  166  42.6  257  11.2  67
Andean  Pact  90  140.6  1562  21.3  237
Maghreb  62  109.6  1768  22.7  366
CACM  25  24.0  964  5.7  228
UDEAC  23  18.4  800  3.4  148
GCC  20  150.6  7530  38.8  1940
CARICOM  6  9.7  1617  4.2  700
Memorandum  Item3:
EC  325  4401  13542  1070  3292
EFTA  32  637  19906  184  5750
x/  1987
Source:  The  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1990;  The  World
Bank  Atlas  1989;  IMF,  Internatlonal  Financial  Statistics;
IMF,  Direction  of  Trade  various  issues.50
Table  2:  SELECTED  INTEGRATION  GROUPS:  INTRAREGIONAL  EXPORTS
Value  Share  of  Intraregional  Exports  in
in  1989  Total  Exports
(m nn)  1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989
in percent
ASEAN  22,648  14.7 15.7 17.8 16.8 17.7 18.3 18.6
LAIA  9,348  10.2 13.5 13.5  8.9 10.7 10.9  9.7
GCC  3,612  . . . 4.6  5.6  5.4  5.2
ECOWAS  1,513  2.1  3.1  3.9  4.2  5.5  7.9  7.2
Andean  Pact  1,157  2.8  5.4  3.3  3.1  3.2  4.9. 4.7
CACM  570  26.8 23.4 22.0 15.0 11.9  11.9  12.5
SADCC-PTA  x/  537  . . 5.1  4.7  6.7  6.0  5.5
Maghreb  517  . . . . 1.5  1.8  2.1
CARICOM  426  7.8  8.3  8.7 12.0 10.5 11.1  12.9
UDEAC  184  3.4  3.9  4.1  0.7  0.9  3.9  3.9
Memorandum  Items:
EC  852,600  48.9 49.4 52.8 54.9 58.8 59.9 62.5
EFTA  25,952  28.0 18.5 14.8 13.6 14.7 14.1 13.9
x/  excluding  intraregional  exports  by  Botswana,  Lesotho  and
Swaziland.
Source:  A.  Inotai,  Regional  Integrations  in  the  New  World
Economic  Environment,  Akad4mial  Kiad6,  Budapest,  1986,  p.
44;  P.  Robson,  The  Economics  of  International
Integration,  London:  Allen  &  Unwin,  1987;  OECD,  Foreign
Trade  Statistics;  IMF,  Di.ection  of  Trade  StatistTcs.
Yearbook  199051
Table  3: SELECTED  INTEGRATION  GROUPS:  GROWTH  RATES  OF  TOTAL  AND
INTRAREGIONAL  EXPORTS
Total  exports  Intraregional  exports
1987  1989  Index  1987  1989  index
US$  mn  (1987=100)  USS  mn  (1987=100)
ASEAN  82,085  121,467 148.0  14,529  22,648  155.9
LAIA  55,107  69,188  125.6  8,595  9,348  108.8
GCC  80,327 96,371  120.0  3,086  3,612  117.0
ECOWAS  16,091 20,946  130.2  885  1,513  171.0
Andean  Pact  21,344  24,825  116.3  683  1,157  169.4
CACM  4,134  4,547  110.0  492  570  115.9
SADCC-PTA  x/  7,609  9,784  128.6  507  537  105.9
Maghreb  21,367  24,164  113.1  325  517  159.1
CARICOM  2,810  3,302  117.5  295  426  144.4
UDEAC  4,222  4,675  110.7  38  184  484.2
Memorandum  item:
World  exports  2487,100  3026,300  121.7
x/  excluding  intraregional  exports  by  Botswana,  Lesotho  and
Swaziland.
Source:  IMF,  Direction  of  Trade.  Yearbook  1990;  United  Nations,
Monthly  Bulletin  of  Statistics;  The  World  Bank,  World
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